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I. INTRODUCTION: MUSICAL PARODY AS A DISTINCT GENRE
This Article examines the fair use defense1 under the Copy-
* This Article is a revised version of a paper entitled The Potential Harm to an
Original Author's Copyrighted Musical Expression Engendered By Musical Parody which
was awarded First Place in the 1988 Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition at Vanderbilt
University School of Law.
** J.D., 1988, Vanderbilt University School of Law. Mr. Del Casino presently is an as-
sociate with the law firm of King & Ballow, Nashville, Tennessee. He would like to extend a
special thanks to Professor Jerome D. Reichman of Vanderbilt University School of Law for
his guidance, support, and encouragement.
1. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). Section 107 reads in full as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any
other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholar-
ship, or research, is not an infringement of the copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to
be considered shall include -
(1) the purpose and character of the uge, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
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right Act of 19762 as applied to musical parody' in light of the
evolving copyright infringement calculus which emphasizes the ef-
fect of the infringement upon the market for the original work that
is the subject of the parody. Specifically, this Article will examine
the resulting harm to the market for the copyright of the original
author4 engendered by the musical parodist's use of the original
author's copyrighted melody. Particular attention will be focused
on the harm to the original author's broadcast performance right,5
as well as the potential harm to the original author's exclusive
right to prepare derivative works.
Part II of this Article begins with an examination and analysis
of the various fair use cases that have promulgated the standards
by which it is determined whether a given musical parody is within
the scope of fair use. Fair use is a defense that a parodist may offer
to a claim of copyright infringement. This Article suggests, how-
ever, that while many of the cases have enunciated and applied
standards consistent with section 107' of the Copyright Act of
1976, most have failed to take into account the unique nature of
musical parody, as distinguished from other forms of parody, in
determining whether the musical parody is within the scope of fair
use. As this Article demonstrates, this is inconsistent with the
modern doctrine of fair use as refined in Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.8 and Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enterprises." The doctrine would seem to demand exam-
ination of the injury to the underlying musical composition, which
2. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
3. For the purposes of this Article, no distinction is made between parody and bur-
lesque; the terms are used interchangeably. For a detailed discussion of the differences be-
tween parody, burlesque, and travesty, see Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of
Copyright, 33 CANADIAN BAR REV. 1130 (1955).
4. For tile purposes of this Article, the terms "original author," "author," "original
composer," and "composer" are used interchangeably to denote the creator of the original
work being parodied.
The Copyright Act also provides:
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the
work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title (17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-914 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)], and, unless the parties have expressly agreed
otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights com-
prised in the copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982).
5. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1982).
6. Id. § 106(2).
7. Id. § 107. The full text of § 107 is set forth at supra note 1.
8. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
9. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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is not parodied.
Part III discusses a few forms of musical parody which fre-
quently are overlooked by the courts. Specifically, the Section ex-
amines the copyright holder's potential loss of the television broad-
cast performance fee; the possible foreclosure of the parody market
to the original composers themselves; the possible inability of orig-
inal composers to sell synchronization licenses for the use of their
melody as background music for motion pictures and television;
and finally, the potential dilution of the original copyright due to
overexposure of the melody from parody.
Traditionally, the parodist takes material from the original
work of authorship being parodied in order to identify that work as
the object of his or her own creative work.' 0 The parodist then
adds new material to the underlying work through his or her own
individual creative effort to effectuate the parody." What distin-
guishes traditional parody 2 from musical parody, however, is the
difference in the underlying copyrighted work that is the object of,
or vehicle for, the parody. Whereas the copyright in a traditional
literary work involves only the author's written or literary expres-
sion, the copyright in a traditional musical work pertains to the
author's own written or literary expression, in combination with
the author's musical expression. This difference naturally is carried
over when the works are parodied. While the traditional literary
parodist effectuates his or her parody by adding new words to the
underlying work, the musical parodist usually adds new lyrics to
the composition to effectuate the parody, but seldom adds any ele-
ment of parody to the melody of the composition itself.'3 Most
courts deem this addition of new lyric material to the original mu-
sical work sufficient to bring the parody within the scope of fair
use;' 4 but this reasoning ignores the potential harm to the original
10. Clemmons, Author v. Parodist: Striking a Compromise, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 3 (1985).
11. Id.
12. The term "traditional parody" is used only to distinguish the parodying of poems,
books, essays, and plays, which are works that involve only the element of the author's
written or literary expression, from musical parody, which also includes, in addition to the
element of the author's written or literary expression, the element of the author's musical
expression. Similarly, a parody of a cartoon may be more akin to a musical parody in that,
in addition to the element of the author's written or literary expression, the parody also
targets the author's artistic expression of drawing and painting.
13. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180
(2d Cir. 1981); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980); Walt Disney Productions v. Mature Pictures Corp.,
389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
14. See Fisher, 794 F.2d at 439; Elsmere, 482 F. Supp. 741.
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composer's copyrighted melody, which has not been parodied, and
it particularly ignores the harm to the original composer's market
interest despite the teachings of Sony Corporation of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.15 and Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enterprises.'
Sony and Harper & Row have refined the general fair use
standard and have given it a new and more limited thrust. They
place particular emphasis on the market for, or value of, the origi-
nal copyrighted work, as well as on the potential harm to the de-
rivative markets for that original work. As applied to musical par-
ody, both of these cases evince a need to examine the potential
harm to the original author's copyright, especially in light of the
unique nature of musical works and musical parody as distinct
from traditional literary works and literary parody.
II. WITHOUT RHYME OR REASON: AMBIGUITIES IN THE MUSICAL
PARODY DECISIONS
A. Early Assimilation of Musical Parody to the Fair Use
Standards
1. To "Recall or Conjure Up"
One of the earliest cases determining whether a parody came
within the scope of fair use was Columbia Pictures Corp. v. Na-
tional Broadcasting Co.17 Comedian Sid Caesar parodied the mo-
tion picture From Here To Eternity's in an NBC television skit
entitled "From Here To Obscurity." The court found that al-
though the parody used material appearing in the motion picture,
the parody was a new, original, and different literary work as com-
pared with the motion picture" and there was no substantial simi-
larity between the parody and the motion picture.20
The case is of paramount importance for two reasons. First,
the case signaled a retreat by the District Court for the Southern
District of California from its earlier holding in Loew's Inc. v. Co-
15. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). See infra notes 116-126 and accompanying text.
16. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). See infra notes 116-126 and accompanying text.
17. 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
18. (Columbia 1953).
19. Columbia Pictures Corp, 137 F. Supp. at 352.
20. Id. There were, in fact, some similarities between the parody and the motion pic-
ture, including: the settings, some of the situations and some of the principal characters.
There also were similarities in the development of the plot. However, the court did not
characterize these as substantial; hence, there was no copyright infringement.
[Vol. 6:35
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lumbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc.,21 where it held that copying
for the purpose of parody or burlesque should be treated no differ-
ently from any other appropriation.22 Second, the Columbia Pic-
tures court launched what has become the standard for the
amount of subject matter a parodist may appropriate from the
original author:
Since a burlesquer must make a sufficient use of the original to
recall or conjure up the subject matter being burlesqued, the law
permits more extensive use of the protectable portion of a copy-
righted work in the creation of a burlesque of that work than in
the creation of other fictional or dramatic works not intended as
a burlesque of the original.23
This has come to be known as the "recall or conjure up" standard,
and expressly was adopted by the Second Circuit in Berlin v. E. C.
Publications, Inc.24
In Berlin, defendants' magazine Mad published a collection of
lyric parodies satirizing modern life. While the publication did not
supply any music and injected only brief phrases of the original
lyrics into the parodies, the magazine directed the readers to sing
the parodies to the tune of several well-known standard songs, in-
cluding several standards by composer Irving Berlin. Plaintiffs
claimed that defendants' directions to sing the parodies to the tune
of plaintiffs' copyrighted music constituted infringement.
The district court held that the defendants had created "origi-
nal, ingenious lyrics on subjects completely dissimilar from those
of plaintiffs' songs. "25 Plaintiffs then claimed that defendants' di-
rections to sing the parodies to the tune of plaintiffs' copyrighted
music constituted infringement. The court responded: "It is diffi-
cult to see how music can be copied when it is not reproduced."2
On appeal, the Second Circuit found that the defendants'
work was not substantially similar to, and therefore did not in-
fringe the copyright in, the plaintiffs' work. 7 This finding ordina-
21. 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d
532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v.
Loew's Inc., 356 -U.S. 43 (1958) (equally divided court).
22. Loew's, 131 F. Supp. at 177.
23. Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348, 354 (S.D.
Cal. 1955).
24. 329 F.2d 541, 542-43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964).
25. Berlin v. E. C. Publications, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 911, 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), 329 F.2d
541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964).
26. Id. at 914.
27. Berlin, 329 F.2d at 545.
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rily would preclude discussion of fair use, for fair use is a defense
to a finding of infringement. 8 Nonetheless, Judge Irving R. Kauf-
man, writing for the Second Circuit and echoing the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision in Loew's, stated:
Where, as here, it is clear that parody has neither the intent nor
the effect of fulfilling the demand for the original, and where the
parodist does not appropriate a greater amount of the original
work than is necessary to "recall or conjure up" the object of his
satire a finding of infringement would be improper.29
This is the standard adopted by the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for fair use determination in parody cases."0
The plaintiffs in Berlin premised a significant portion of their
infringement claim on the fact that the defendants instructed
readers to sing the parodies to the tune of the copyrighted, stan-
dard songs. As defendants did not reproduce any of the music, it
was certainly not an infringement,"' and the plaintiffs' premise was
completely erroneous. The Court of Appeals acknowledged this,
stating: "[P]laintiffs appear to seek redress upon a theory of copy-
right relief, closely resembling that behind recovery for unjust en-
28. Cf. W. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 161 (1985) ("On appeal,
the Second Circuit explored the question of parody at great length. This exploration, though
valuable, was nevertheless dictum since the court found that defendant's work was not sub-
stantially similar to plaintiffs' works, and hence no question of fair use was decided.")
29. Berlin, 329 F.2d at 545.
30. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 184 (2d Cir. 1981); Elsmere Music, Inc. v.
National Broadcasting Company, 482 F. Supp. 741, 745 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d
Cir. 1980). The Second Circuit stopped short of deciding "whether a substantial taking, one
far beyond that necessary to conjure up the original, would be permissible." W. PARRY,
supra note 28, at 161. The court eventually did decide this question, see infra note 62 and
accompanying text, and later retreated from this position. See infra notes 76-85 and accom-
panying text.
31. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982). § 501(a) states: "Anyone who violates any of the exclu-
sive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 118 ... is an infringer
of the copyright."
In this respect, Berlin foreshadowed the result in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). In Sony, producers of films and television programs
sued the manufacturers of the Betamax home videocasette taping system. The producers
claimed that Sony infringed their rights in their copyrighted televised films and programs
when owners of Betamax equipment taped the television broadcasts. Id. at 420. Berlin and
Sony are similar in that, in both cases, defendants did not reproduce the plaintiff's material;
rather, it was the consumer, who purchased the defendant's product (Betamax or Mad), who
was reproducing the work. The consumer did so, however, only for his own personal use in
his home, not for profit which the copyright law specifically permits under § 110(5). Not
surprisingly, then, the Court found for Sony, holding that whether someone used Sony's
equipment to infringe plaintiff's copyrights was not relevant as the defendants themselves
did not actually reproduce any of the plaintiff's copyrighted material.
[Vol. 6:35
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richment."32 Plaintiffs, in essence, were seeking relief for defend-
ant's instruction to its readers rather than for any real damages, as
defendants had not reproduced the work.
The Second Circuit's use of the "recall or conjure up" stan-
dard in Berlin was imprudent for the facts of the case did not war-
rant its application. As one author has suggested, "[B]erlin . . .
would be seen.., to be not a fair use case at all. Perhaps, indeed,
[it is] not even a copyright case, for there is on the face of things
no copying of either word or theme.""3 Since only brief phrases of
the original lyrics were used3 4 and none of the author's original
music was reproduced, 5 the court did not need to apply the "recall
or conjure up" standard to such an insignificant amount which, by
all rights, cannot be viewed as an appropriation of the copyrighted
expression.
Furthermore, the application of the "recall or conjure up"
standard in Berlin was especially unfortunate because it has be-
come the standard by which most fair use determinations in par-
ody are measured.36 Much of the confusion surrounding the fair
use determination in musical parody may be attributed directly to
later courts' labeling Berlin a fair use musical parody case when it
probably was not a fair use case at all. 7 Similarly, the tendency of
present day courts to neglect the potential harm to the original
author's musical expression may be attributed directly to Berlin.
While Berlin addressed the de minimis appropriation of the origi-
nal author's literary expression (for example, the lyrics), it did not
address the appropriation of the original author's musical expres-
sion because it did not have to-the defendants did not reproduce
any of the musical expression. Accordingly, the Berlin court did
not examine the potential harm to the original author's musical
expression engendered by musical parody.38 Although the result in
Berlin was correct, subsequent cases relying upon Berlin and the
"recall or conjure up" standard, invariably fail to take into account
32. Berlin, 329 F.2d at 543.
33. L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 43 (1978).
34. Berlin, 329 F.2d at 545.
35. See supra text accompanying notes 25 & 30-31.
36. See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Ameri-
can Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 654 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1981),
on final hearing, 530 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), afl'd, 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983);
Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd,
623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 425 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), a/I'd as
modified, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981).
37. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 121-135.
1989]
7
Del Casino: The Potential Harm of Musical Parody: Toward an Enlightened Fair
Published by Institutional Repository, 1989
42 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
the potential harm to the original author's musical expression.
2. The "Best Parody" Limitation
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit took
the opportunity to examine the Berlin "recall or conjure up" stan-
dard in Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates.39 The case in-
volved the defendants' counterculture comic books in which the
defendants portrayed such Disney cartoon characters as Mickey
Mouse and Donald Duck engaging in promiscuous sexual acts and
taking illicit drugs. Although this was not a musical parody case, it
is of critical importance to the music parody issue because the
court points to the distinction between the physical aspects of the
work and its conceptual aspects, in this case the distinction be-
tween the artistic expression of drawing and the literary
expression.4"
Just as cartoon characters are a combination of two distinct
elements, the author's artistic expression and the author's literary
expression, so popular songs combine the songwriter's musical ex-
pression with his or her literary expression. Yet, most of the musi-
cal parody cases fail to recognize this distinction.4 This defective
analysis often leads to the result that a musical parodist who has
appropriated a significant portion of the original author's musical
expression, is nonetheless permitted to assert the fair use
defense.42
Air Pirates is noted primarily for the limitation that it placed
on the Berlin "recall or conjure up" test. Given the widespread
recognition of the Disney characters depicted in comparison with
other characters, the court observed that "very little would have
been necessary to place Mickey Mouse and his image in the minds
39. 345 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Cal. 1972), af['d in part and rev'd in part, 581 F.2d 751
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1978).
40. 581 F.2d at 757.
In order to facilitate application of... the Berlin test, it is important to deter-
mine what are the relevant parts of each work that are compared in analyzing
similarity. Plaintiff assumes in its brief that the graphic depiction, or pictorial
illustration, is separately copyrightable as a component part .. . .Defendants
proceed on the assumption that comparing their characters with plaintiff's in-
volves a comparison not only of the physical image but also of the character's
personality, pattern of speech, abilities and other traits. Apparently this issue
has not been addressed previously, and neither position is without merit.
Id. On the facts of Air Pirates, the courts found it unnecessary to explore this distinction. In
its view, the defendants took more than was allowed under the Berlin test as it applied to
both the conceptual and physical aspects of the characters. Id.
41. See supra text accompanying note 20.
42. See infra notes 56-60.
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of the readers."'43 The court further stated: "[W]hen the medium
involved is a comic book, a recognizable caricature is not difficult
to draw, so that an alternative that involves less copying is more
likely to be available than if a speech, for instance, is parodied." 4
Here the court found that the exact reproduction of the character
was not necessary to effectuate the parody. Defendants asserted
that they copied no more than necessary and claimed that "the
humorous effect of parody is best achieved when at first glance the
material appears convincingly to be the original, and upon closer
examination is discovered to be quite something else." '45 The court
recognized that to accept this assertion would be to justify sub-
stantially verbatim copying; it therefore rejected the right of the
defendants to make the "best parody":
[W]hen persons are parodying a copyrighted work, the con-
straints of the existing precedent do not permit them to take as
much of a component part as they need to make the "best par-
ody." Instead, their desire to make the "best parody" is bal-
anced against the rights of the copyright owner in his original
expressions. That balance has been struck at giving the parodist
what is necessary to conjure up the original, and in the absence
of a special need for accuracy ... that standard was exceeded
here. By copying the images in their entirety, defendants took
more than was necessary to place firmly in the reader's mind the
parodied work and those specific attributes that are to be
satirized.4"
This was the first important limitation on the "recall or con-
jure up" standard. Of particular significance was the court's refer-
ence to limiting the amount taken of a "component part" because
it recognized the two distinct elements of artistic and literary ex-
pression that merge in cartoon characters.4 7 In Air Pirates the de-
fendants did not parody the artistic expression of the Disney char-
acters; rather, they appropriated the artistic expression and placed
the characters in situations antithetical to the innocent image that
the Disney characters represent. The court noted that had the de-
fendants parodied the characters themselves, greater license might
have been necessary in copying the graphic images "8 such as the
artistic expression. Instead the court found that the defendants'
43. 581 F.2d at 757-58.
44. Id. at 758.
45. Id.
46. Id. (citations omitted)(emphasis added).
47. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
48. 581 F.2d at 758.
1989]
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only purpose was "to track Disney's work as a whole,"49 and im-
plied that the defendants thus had attempted to capitalize on the
widespread recognition of the Disney characters.
Because musical parodies lend themselves to a similar analysis
based on the union of the author's musical expression and his or
her literary expression, it seems logical to apply the same limita-
tion on fair use in this context. Query then, in light of Air Pirates,
does the parodying of an author's lyrics warrant the appropriation
of a significant portion of the author's musical expression when
that is neither parodied nor altered in any way? Is there a special
need for accuracy in musical parody that justifies the appropria-
tion of the author's musical expression, or is it merely the paro-
dist's desire to achieve the "best parody"?
As the court noted in Air Pirates, the desire to achieve the
best parody must be "balanced against the rights of the copyright
owner in his original expression and that balance has been struck
at giving the parodist what is necessary to conjure up the origi-
nal." 50 To allow the verbatim copying of the author's musical ex-
pression would seem to exceed the "recall or conjure up" standard
and would allow the parodist to create the "best parody," contrary
to Judge Cummings's admonition in Air Pirates. Moreover, courts
that tolerate a verbatim copying of the original author's musical
expression overlook the potential effect of that use upon the mar-
ket for or value of the copyrighted work, contrary to section 107 of
the Copyright Act of 1976.51 The emerging modern fair use stan-
dard derived from the Supreme Court's decisions in both Sony
Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios52 and Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,3 emphasizes that
courts must view the potential effects on the market for the copy-
right owner's work as part of infringement. In light of this, there
must be some limitations upon the parodist's verbatim copying of
the original author's musical expression.
3. The Near Evisceration of the Standard
The most significant, and arguably detrimental, expansion of
the "recall or conjure up" standard occurred in Elsmere Music,
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See supra note 1.
52. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
53. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). See infra text accompanying notes 116-126.
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Inc. v. National Broadcasting Company." There, defendant
NBC's television program "Saturday Night Live" presented a skit
satirizing New York state's advertising campaign to attract tour-
ists. The defendant portrayed the Chamber of Commerce of the
biblical city of Sodom, discussing Sodom's poor public image with
out-of-towners and the effect this image was having on its tourist
trade. To combat a negative image, the members decided upon a
new advertising campaign to highlight the less sensational aspects
of Sodom's night life. As the skit closed, three Saturday Night Live
cast members sang "I Love Sodom" to the identical four note mel-
ody of "I Love New York," the memorable song which had been
used so effectively in New York's advertising campaign. Defendant
repeated the melody four times.5
Defendant claimed that its use of plaintiff's melody was no
more than was necessary to create an effective parody. This was at
worst a de minimis infringement, which is permitted as a fair use
under the Copyright Act.5 8 In contrast, the plaintiff contended that
the use was not de minimis and was far more extensive than neces-
sary to conjure up the original.
The district court found that, although the actual taking in-
volved was relatively slight, "on closer examination it becomes ap-
parent that this portion of the piece, the musical phrase that the
lyrics 'I Love New York' accompany, is the heart of the composi-
tion. ' 57 The court acknowledged that use of such a significant por-
tion was not a de minimis taking and in fact constituted a taking
of a substantial nature .5  At the same time, the court recognized
that defendant had neither interfered with the marketability nor
54. 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
55. 482 F. Supp. at 744.
56. Id.
57. Id. "It is this musical phrase, for example, that is constantly repeated during the
course of most of the 'I Love New York' campaign's television commercials and serves as the
musical theme for such commercials." Id. at 744, n.6. See also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539.
Plaintiffs Harper & Row were the copyright holders of a book of the presidential memoirs of
former President Gerald R. Ford. Plaintiffs entered into an agreement with Time Magazine
to publish a brief excerpt of the book, which was to run one week before they shipped the
book to bookstores. Id. at 542-43. By clandestine means, defendants obtained an advance
copy of the book and published 300-400 words from the book in their magazine The Nation
in a deliberate effort to scoop Time. Id. at 562. The passages quoted were Ford's recollection
of the circumstances leading to his pardon of former President Richard M. Nixon. Arguably,
these were the ones most likely to appeal to the reading audience. The Court found, "In
absolute terms, the words actually quoted were an insubstantial portion of [the book] 'A
Time to Heal.' The District Court, however, found that '[t]he Nation took what was essen-
tially the heart of the book.'" Id. at 564-65 (emphasis added)(citing the opinion of the
district court, 557 F. Supp 1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
58. 482 F. Supp. at 744.
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affected the value of the copyrighted work. Moreover, the defend-
ant's use did not "have ... the 'effect of fulfilling the demand for
the original.' "59 As a result, the court held that defendant had not
taken more than was necessary to conjure up the original.60
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court in a per curiam opinion stating: "[I]n today's world of
often unrelieved solemnity, copyright law should be hospitable to
the humor of parody . . . ."' In a footnote, the court nearly eviscer-
ated the Berlin "recall or conjure up" standard by expanding the
scope of permissible taking in parody cases:
The District Court concluded, among other things, that the par-
ody did not make more extensive use of appellant's song than
was necessary "to conjure up" the original. While we agree with
this conclusion, we note that the concept of "conjuring up" an
original came into the copyright law not as a limitation on how
much of an original may be used, but as a recognition that a
parody frequently needs to be more than a fleeting evocation of
an original in order to make its humorous point. Columbia Pic-
tures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co. A parody is entitled at
least to "conjure up" the original. Even more extensive use
would still be fair use, provided the parody builds upon the orig-
inal, using the original as a known element of modern culture
and contributing something new for humorous effect or
commentary.62
Elsmere Music has met with marked criticism from commenta-
tors.63 One author, reaching a very different conclusion from the
one reached by the Elsmere Music court, suggested that:
while a parodist might take more than was necessary to conjure
up the original, he did so at the risk that the trier of fact would
find the taking to have been substantial, i.e., a 'bodily appropri-
ation,' and therefore an infringing and not a fair use. 4
The late Professor Melville Nimmer also thought that the Second
Circuit went too far in Elsmere Music by "suggesting an open-en-
ded standard whereby wholesale appropriation of another's work
becomes possible under the banner of fair use provided only that
59. Id. at 747.
60. Id.
61. Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1980).
62. Id. at 253 n.1 (construing Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co.,
137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955)) (cifation omitted).
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elements of humor are added."6
These criticisms are well placed, and in fact the Second Cir-
cuit later retreated from the Elsmere Music footnote.6 6 However,
the criticisms do not address the hidden and more pernicious dan-
ger of the decision: its failure to take into account the potential
harm to the underlying musical copyright.6 7 Although the district
court acknowledged that the musical phrase accompanying the
lyrics "I Love New York" was the "heart of the composition," 8 it
erroneously concluded that defendant had not taken more than
was necessary to conjure up the underlying work. What the court
failed to assess was that these four notes constituted the portion of
the plaintiff's work upon which its popular appeal, and hence its
commercial success, depended.6 9 The repetition of those four notes
and the words "I Love New York" constituted the entire television
commercial advertisement. Similarly, to the average listener, that
melodic refrain constituted the whole musical composition "I Love
New York." Yet, in one unsubstantiated blanket statement the
court decided that the parodist's appropriation of the original au-
thor's musical expression did not interfere with either the market-
ability of the copyrighted work or its value.7 °
B. In Search of a Modern Fair Use Standard: The Market
Analysis
1. A Borderline Case
Although MCA, Inc. v. Wilson 1 is generally assimilated with
the musical parody cases,72 it was not decided as a musical parody
case. The district court rejected the defendants' attempt to invoke
the fair use defense.73 The case involved the transformation of the
plaintiff's copyrighted song, "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of Com-
pany B," into "Cunnilingus Champion of Company C." The court's
65. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[C] at 13-90.6 (1987).
66. See infra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 121-135.
68. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
69. See generally Robertson v. Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn, Inc., 146 F. Supp.
795 (S.D. Cal. 1956) (two bars in defendant's commercials are identical to two of four bars of
plaintiff's key melody, that portion of it upon which its popular appeal, and hence, its com-
mercial success, depends).
70. 482 F. Supp. at 747.
71. 425 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd as modified, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981).
72. See, e.g., 3 M. NiMMER, supra note 65, at § 13.05[C]; W. PATRY, supra note 28, at
165.
73. 425 F. Supp. at 453.
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rejection of the parody defense seemed influenced by the defend-
ant's own admission that he did not intend his work to be a bur-
lesque or satire, but rather that he engineered the similarities be-
tween the two compositions in an attempt to generate publicity.7 4
On appeal, the Second Circuit concluded that the defendants
did not make fair use of the plaintiff's song, but questioned the
lower court's emphasis on the substantiality of the taking. The ap-
pellate court hinted that, on the same facts it might not have
found "that the amount copied was so substantial as to be unfairly
excessive."7 5
2. The Second Circuit Retreats to Berlin
In Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc.7"
the Second Circuit retreated from its Elsmere Music footnote
which set forth an open-ended standard of the amount of copy-
righted expression that a parodist could appropriate.77 Warner
Bros. involved the ABC television program The Greatest American
Hero, in which the protagonist was arguably reminiscent of Super-
man. Plaintiffs claimed that The Greatest American Hero in-
fringed their copyright in the Superman character by appropriat-
ing precisely those attributes that are unique to Superman.
Denying the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, the
district court held that, in comparison, the characters and their re-
spective stories were so dissimilar as to preclude a finding of sub-
stantial similarity.78 The court acknowledged that the defendants
took some of the copyrighted Superman material, but recognized
that the defendants used this material "as a springboard to create
an independent intellectual property."79 Citing Berlin, the district
court found that the defendants did not make more extensive use
of the original than was necessary to recall or conjure up Super-
man. o Even if it had, the court cited the troublesome footnote in
74. Id. at 448.
75. 677 F.2d at 185. "[Wle have not overlooked the district court's finding that the
amount copied [from the plaintiff's song] was so substantial as to be unfairly excessive.
Although we might have reached a different conclusion on the same facts, the district
court's finding was not clearly erroneous and furnishes further support for its holding of
infringement." Id.
76. 523 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 654 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1981), on final hearing,
530 F. Supp. 1187 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983).
77. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
78. 523 F. Supp. at 616.
79. Id. at 617.
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Elsmere Music,"' which had rejected the characterization of the
"conjure up" test as a limit on the parodist's freedom to borrow.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that
the two works were not substantially similar.8 2 However, the appel-
late court disagreed with the district court on the parody issue and
specifically sought to retract the open-ended standard suggested in
Elsmere Music.8 3 Indeed, the Second Circuit now rediscovered the
substantiality limit it had previously eviscerated:
Suffice it to say that while the [parody] defense might be appli-
cable to those isolated instances in which a nearly identical line
from the plaintiffs' script, or express reference to one of the
plaintiffs' characters was made, we question whether the defense
could be used to shelter an entire work that is substantially sim-
ilar [to] and in competition with the copyrighted work. 4
This represented a significant retreat from Elsmere Music and sig-
naled a return to the "recall or conjure up" standard of Berlin. 5
On final hearing, the district court found that what the de-
fendants took from the plaintiffs' works and incorporated into The
Greatest American Hero were unprotected ideas.86 Finding no il-
licit appropriation, the court granted the defendants summary
judgment. On appeal from the summary judgment, the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court, acknowledging that the "parody"
branch of the "fair use" doctrine was itself a means of fostering the
creativity protected by the copyright law."7 The court stated: "It is
decidedly in the interests of creativity, not piracy, to permit au-
thors to take well-known phrases and fragments from copyrighted
works and add their own contributions of commentary or
humor.""8
Read in conjunction with the court's retraction of the Elsmere
Music standard,8 9 this quote also would seem to imply a limitation
on the permissible amount of taking of copyrighted expression by
the parodist. This follows because the Second Circuit would seem
81. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
82. Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 654 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir.
1981).
83. See supra note 62.
84. 654 F.2d at 211.
85. Accord W. PATRY, supra note 28, at 175.
86. 530 F. Supp. 1187, 1190 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), af['d 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983).
87. Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 242 (2d Cir.
1983).
88. Id.
89. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
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to allow the invocation of the parody defense only in "those iso-
lated instances in which a nearly identical line from plaintiffs'
[work]" 90 is used, or where in the interests of creativity a parodist
"[takes] well-known phrases and fragments from copyrighted
works and add[s] [his or her] own contribution of commentary or
humor."'" This suggests that verbatim copying will not be permit-
ted, and that a parodist may not take more than is necessary to
"recall or conjure up."
In the case of musical parody, the parodist who appropriates
the "heart of the composition" 2 would seem to exceed the limita-
tions of Warner Bros. By the same token, a parodist's use of a
composer's "recognizable main theme"93 also would exceed that
limit.
3. The Ninth Circuit Departs from Air Pirates
In the most recent of the fair use musical parody cases, Fisher
v. Dees, 4 the composers of When Sunny Gets Blue sued the cre-
ators of When Sunny Sniffs Glue, a purported parody of the plain-
tiffs' composition. The defendants copied the first six of the song's
thirty-eight bars of music which constituted its recognizable main
theme. They also changed the opening lyrics, "When Sunny gets
blue, her eyes get gray and cloudy, then rain begins to fall" to
"When Sunny sniffs glue, her eyes get red and bulgy, then her hair
begins to fall." ' 5 The plaintiffs appealed the district court's entry
of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.9 6 The plaintiffs
advanced five principal reasons why the parody was not a fair use,
three of which are pertinent to this Article: (1) defendants' use was
commercial in nature; (2) the parody competed in the same mar-
ket-record albums and tapes-as the plaintiffs' song; (3) the tak-
ing of the plaintiffs' musical expression was more substantial than
was necessary to "conjure up" the original in the mind of the
audience.97
90. See supra note 84.
91. See supra note 88.
92. See supra notes 57-59.
93. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
94. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
95. Id. at 434.
96. "The district court did not reveal the basis for its decision. Nonetheless, we may
affirm if the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the composers, discloses no genu-
ine issues of material fact and if Dees was entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 794 F.2d
at 434.
97. The other two reasons advanced by the plaintiffs as to why the parody was not a
fair use were: (1) The so-called parody was not actually a parody, or at least was not a
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The defendants conceded that the parody was a commercial
use of the song, which the Ninth Circuit noted "'tends to weigh
against a finding of fair use.'" 9 8 The court acknowledged that
"'every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively
an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to
the owner of the copyright,' , but recognized "that many paro-
dies distributed commercially may be 'more in the nature of an
editorial or social commentary than . . .an attempt to capitalize
financially on the plaintiff's original work.' ,1oo It followed that the
initial presumption of exploitation need not be fatal and that the
defendant could rebut the presumption "by convincing the court
that the parody does not unfairly diminish the economic value of
the original." 1°
Accordingly, the court focused its examination on the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work. 02 Its test was whether the parody "fulfills the [market] de-
mand" for the original, which occurs "when a parody supplants the
original in markets the original is aimed at, or in which the original
is, or has reasonable potential to become, commercially valua-
ble."'103 Stressing the difference between the two versions of
Sunny, the court held that the parodied work did not fulfill the
same demand that the parody did and, consequently, the parody
had no cognizable effect on the original. 04
The court next focused its examination on the amount and
substantiality of the taking.10 5 Relying heavily upon Elsmere Mu-
sic's footnoted expansion of the "recall or conjure up" standard, 06
the court emphasized that a popular song was difficult to parody
effectively because any substantial variation would make it un-
parody of the composers' song; and (2) the defendants' bad conduct should bar their use of
the equitable defense of fair use. The court of appeals disposed of both claims holding that
the defendants' version was intended to poke fun at the plaintiff composer's song and that
the plaintiffs failed to identify any conduct of the defendants that was sufficiently blame-
worthy. Id. at 436-437.
98. Id. at 437 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S.
539, 562 (1985)).
99. Id. at 437 (quoting Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)).
100. Id. at 437 (quoting Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Productions, Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q.
124, 131 (N.D. Ga. 1981)).
101. Id. at 437.
102. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1982). The full text of § 107 is set forth at supra note 1.
103. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986).
104. Id.
105. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1982). The full text of § 107 is set forth at supra note 1.
106. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
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recognizable to the general audience." 7 Noting that the parodist's
desire to create the "best parody"'1 8 must be balanced against the
rights of the copyright owner in his original expression, the court
held that the balance tipped in favor of the parodist who took no
more than was reasonably necessary to accomplish reasonably his
purpose. 0 9 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment and concluded that When
Sunny Sniffs Glue was a parody deserving of fair use protection as
a matter of law." 0
While the Ninth Circuit's examination of parody in Fisher was
thorough and informative, it unwisely relied on the Elsmere Music
footnote,"' which the Second Circuit had essentially repudiated
five years earlier in Warner Bros..112 The Ninth Circuit's adher-
ence to the Elsmere Music footnote is inexplicable, particularly in
view of the far more perceptive and equitable standard it enunci-
ated in Air Pirates,'" a standard wholly in accord with the Berlin
"recall or conjure up" test. Furthermore, the Air Pirates standard
takes account of the distinction between "traditional parody" and
"comic strip parody," 1 4 and it recognizes the necessary balance be-
tween the parodist's desire to make the "best parody" and the
copyright owner's interest in the original copyrighted expres-
sions." The Ninth Circuit easily could have adapted its Air Pi-
rates analysis to Fisher and rendered a far more equitable
decision.
4. The Modern Fair Use Standard: Protection of the Market
Interest
Two major Supreme Court cases, Sony Corporation of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.16 and Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,"7 recently have refined the
107. 794 F.2d at 439 ("Like a speech, a song is difficult to parody effectively without
exact or near-exact copying. If the would-be parodist varies the music or meter of the origi-
nal substantially, it simply will not be recognizable to the general audience.").
108. See supra notes 39-53 and accompanying text.
109. Fisher, 794 F.2d at 439.
110. Id. at 440.
111. See supra note 62.
112. See supra notes 76-77.
113. See supra notes 39-53 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 39 & 40 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
116. 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (home videotaping of television broadcast deemed fair use;
hence no action could be maintained against the manufacturer of vidoetaping equipment).
117. 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (unlicensed quoting of 300-400 words from unpublished pres-
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general fair use standards set out in the Copyright Act of 1976 and
placed particular emphasis on the potential harm to the market
for, or value of, the original copyrighted work engendered by the
use claimed to be fair.
In Sony the Supreme Court posited that "every commercial
use [of copyrighted material] is presumptively an unfair exploita-
tion of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the
copyright... "118 If the intended use is for commercial gain, then
the likelihood of harm to the copyright also may be presumed.119
In contrast, where the use is noncommercial, the Supreme Court
will require the copyright owner to show "by a preponderance of
the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm ex-
ists" when resisting a defense of fair use. 20 Accordingly, no matter
on which side of the line the musical parody falls, either commer-
cial or noncommercial, the Supreme Court's holding in Sony man-
dates a closer scrutiny of the effect of the claimed fair use upon the
potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work.
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,2' adopted Professor Nimmer's broad
principle that any adverse effects on the value of any of the rights
in the copyrighted work would make the use unfair. 22 The Court
further expanded the inquiry by mandating that the analysis take
account of harm to the market for derivative works. 23 The Su-
idential memoir by news magazine found not to be a fair use).
118. 464 U.S. at 451. Sony has been the subject of scholarly comment. See, e.g.,
Fisher, Reconstructing The Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1661 (1988) (discussing
the Supreme Court's performance in Sony and Harper & Row).
119. 464 U.S. at 451.
120. Id. The Court summarized the law this way:
A challenge to a noncommercial use of a copyrighted work requires proof either
that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it
would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work. Actual
present harm need not be shown; such a requirement would leave the copyright
holder with no defense against predictable damage. Nor is it necessary to show
with certainty that future harm will result. What is necessary is a showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm
exists.
Id. (emphasis in original).
121. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
122. 471 U.S. at 568 (quoting 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 65, §
13.05[B], at 13-77-13-78).
123. Id. (citing Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos.,
621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1070 (2d Cir. 1977); Roy
Export v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
Harper & Row has been the subject of scholarly comment. See, e.g., Francione, Facing
the Nation: The Standards for Copyright Infringement and Fair Use of Factual Works,
134 U. PA. L. REv. 519 (1986).
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preme Court's holdings in both Sony and Harper & Row clearly
reflect an intention to examine any potential harm to the copy-
righted work whether the impact be directly on the market for the
copyrighted work or upon the market for derivative works.
One of the more significant contributions of Harper & Row is
the Court's enunciation of the burden of proof in fair use cases:
"[O]nce a copyright holder establishes with reasonable probability
the existence of a causal connection between the infringement and
a loss of revenue, the burden properly shifts to the infringer to
show that this damage would have occurred had there been no tak-
ing of copyrighted expression."' 24 Read in conjunction with the
dissent's observation in Sony that uses having little or no economic
impact on the author's rights today can become commercially im-
portant later on,12 5 even this formulation may be too narrow.
As applied to musical parody, these cases justify a careful ex-
amination of the potential harm to the author's copyrighted work
with particular regard to the unique nature of musical copyright
and musical parody as distinct from traditional literary copyright
and literary parody.'26 When the market analysis of Sony and
Harper & Row is applied to musical parody, it exposes a number of
weaknesses in the prior analysis of musical parody that heretofore
have gone undetected. The courts' over-concentration on the origi-
nal author's written or literary expression and the amount of that
expression appropriated by the parodist downplays the potential
harm to the market for, or value of, the composer's musical expres-
sion. Clearly, the Supreme Court's directive in Sony and Harper &
Row was to focus attention on this aspect. of injury to the copyright
owner's rights. Moreover, a more refined analysis of musical par-
ody must take into account the potential harm to the author's de-
rivative market for his or her lyrics as well as his or her musical
expression.
The market analysis of Sony and Harper & Row provides a
sound basis for determining fair use in the parody cases. When
musical parody is analyzed in this light, however, it points to dif-
ferent results from those reached rather uncritically in the past.
III. THE POTENTIAL HARMS ANALYZED UNDER THE CURRENT FAIR
USE STANDARD
Because courts have focused almost exclusively on whether the
124. 471 U.S. at 567.
125. 464 U.S. at 482 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
126. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
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parody supplants the original in its primary market,'27 they have
tended to overlook other potential harms. A parody rarely will ful-
fill the demand for the original; but to conclude, as the Ninth Cir-
cuit did in Fisher v. Dees,2 " that the parody will have no other
cognizable economic effect on the original work 2 ' ignores the pal-
pable damages produced by the unfettered use of the original com-
poser's copyrighted musical expression. 30 These damages must be
factored into the analysis.
A first potential harm to the copyright holder, of special sig-
nificance in the case of Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcast-
ing Company,'3 ' is the loss of the television broadcast performance
fee. The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers
(ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), the principle collec-
tion agencies for broadcast performance royalty fees, employ ex-
tensive logging systems to determine the number of performances
of any copyrighted musical work. Each television network perform-
ance is logged and credited for payment purposes on the basis of a
universal count without resort to sampling. The three television
networks and the television program producers supply program
logs and cue sheets to the performing rights organizations, which
enable the organizations to credit the copyright holder for the per-
formance.'32 On the form that the television producers and net-
works supply, a parody like "I Love Sodom" will not be credited as
"I Love New York," even though the original author's musical ex-
pression was utilized unchanged and was not parodied.
This practice, which reflects the laws' indifference to the musi-
cal component of parody, virtually insures that the composer will
not be credited for the performance of his copyrighted melody. In
light of the fact that ASCAP alone collected $198 million in per-
formance license fees from broadcasters in 1983, and that 46% of
that figure was directly attributable to television licensing fees, 33
it is apparent that broadcast television performances are a lucra-
tive source of income to the composers. Yet, because the original
composer is not credited for the use of his musical expression in
127. See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
128. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
129. See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
130. This generally is due to the courts' failure to recognize the component parts of
musical copyright. See supra notes 39 & 40 and accompanying text.
131. 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
132. S. SHEMEL & W. KRAsILovsKy, THIS BUSINEss OF MUSIC 186 (1985). ASCAP also
makes audio and video tapes of network television performances to verify the accuracy of
the information provided by the networks and program producers. Id.
133. Id. at 182.
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the parody, the parodist has managed to broadcast the song on na-
tional television, thus depriving the composer of a valuable per-
formance fee and impinging upon the value of his rights in the
copyright.
If the musical parodist at least attempts to parody the music
itself,"' then clearly the parodist should be allowed to conjure up
the original to effectuate the parody. But to allow the parodist to
copy the "heart of a composition" or its "recognizable main
theme" is to ignore the rights of the copyright owner in his or her
original expression. Even though parody remains an important
form of social commentary, this does not mean that the rights of
the original author should be overlooked. As the Supreme Court
suggested in Harper & Row, to allow-under the guise of fair
use-the verbatim copying of a composer's melody for a parody in
a television broadcast would be to allow the deprivation of copy-
right owners' "right in their property precisely when they encoun-
ter those users who could afford to pay for it."'135 Undoubtedly, if
television producers are otherwise willing to spend thousands of
dollars for a television production, there should be some remunera-
tion for the use of the composer's original musical expression. The
test that the Supreme Court applied in Harper & Row stressed
just this notion that the user stands to profit without paying the
customary price:
The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the
sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user
stands to profit from the exploitation of the copyrighted mate-
rial without paying the customary price.13 '
A second potential harm to the holder of the copyright is the
foreclosure of the parody market to the original composer himself.
With the recent popular success of such parodies as Like A Stur-
geon, derived from the hit, Like A Virgin, sung by Madonna, and
Eat It, derived from the Michael Jackson hit Beat It, the musical
134. Some parody does, in fact, parody the music itself. See, e.g., T. Lehrer, An Eve-
ning Wasted With Tom Lehrer (1959) (parody of the folk song Clementine, setting similar
lyrical theme to parodies of the musical style of a Mozart operetta and a jazz song, among
others).
135. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 539 ("[T]o propose that fair use be imposed whenever
the 'social value [of dissemination] ... outweighs any detriment to the artist,' would be to
propose depriving copyright owners of their right in the property precisely when they en-
counter those users who could afford to pay for it.") (quoting Gordon, Fair Use as Market
Failure; A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors,
82 COLUm. L. REV. 1600, 1615 (1982)).
136. Id. at 562 (emphasis added).
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parody is becoming an increasingly lucrative outlet for the deriva-
tive exploitation of contemporary hit songs. A parody is clearly a
derivative work.""7 Section 106(2)138 of the Copyright Act of 1976
vests in the copyright holder the exclusive right to prepare deriva-
tive works. Accordingly, if a parodist utilizes the original author's
musical expression to effectuate his or her parody, he may very
well "fulfill the demand" for a parody of the original work in a
market in which the original has "reasonable potential" to become
commercially valuable."3 9 Similarly, other parodists who might be
willing to pay the customary price for using the copyrighted musi-
cal expression to create a parody would no longer be willing to do
so. This curtails the original composers' derivative rights market
and derogates from the exclusive rights granted in the section
106(2) exclusive right.
A third potential harm to the original composers in musical
parody cases is the inability to sell synchronization licenses for the
use of their melody as background music for motion pictures and
television. This holds particularly true with respect to old standard
songs because producers may justifiably fear that audiences will as-
sociate the melody with the parody and the parody's intended
meaning, which will clash with the mood that the producer is at-
tempting to achieve. Will anyone who saw the Saturday Night
Live performance of the parody of I Love New York not immedi-
ately recall I Love Sodom upon hearing I Love New York? Simi-
larly, When Sunny Gets Blue, a song of lost love, now bears the
legacy of a glue-sniffing woman. These two newly associated mean-
ings could deter a producer from utilizing the melodies in a motion
picture or television score.
While the courts in both Elsmere Music and Fisher acknowl-
edged that the parodists had utilized the "heart of the composi-
tion"'40 or the "recognizable main theme,"'' they both failed to
recognize the economic significance of such use. In popular music
it is the catchy and infectious melodic line that sells the work.
137. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Section 101 defines a "derivative work" as "a work based
upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatiza-
tion, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridge-
ment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or
adapted." Id.
138. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982).
139. See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
140. Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 744
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
141. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 (9th Cir. 1986).
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The vocal hook is usually in the chorus. It's the whole message
of the song wrapped up in a few lines. It's the thing you wake up
in the morning singing. It's what pops into your head after
you've only heard the song a few times. It's what sells the
song.
14 2
By utilizing the original composer's melody without parodying
it, the parodist in effect appropriates the most saleable component
of the composition and then associates a new meaning with the
most memorable part of the composition. When a motion picture
producer wishes to evoke a certain feeling, setting, or memory, he
or she relies upon the background music to set the mood. But if
the most memorable part of a song or composition becomes associ-
ated with a new meaning, one that the original composer did not
intend to convey, the producer will turn to a new composition.
This forecloses a potentially lucrative licensing fee to the original
composer.
A final potential harm, and possibly the most significant, is
the potential dilution of the original copyright due to overexposure
of the melody from the parody. If, as in the case of Fisher v. Dees,
any parodist can utilize the "recognizable main theme" of the orig-
inal composer in order to effectuate his or her parody, what is
there to limit numerous parodists from so doing? The more a mel-
ody is subject to multiple uses, the more easily audiences will grow
tired of the melody. Even one successful parody, such as I Love
Sodom, may overexpose the underlying musical theme. If so, there
will follow a decrease in the number of performances that the orig-
inal composition will receive, which reduces the composer's per-
formance income. All five of these arguments present the courts
with compelling reasons to reject a characterization of parody as
fair use, yet to date they have never been acknowledged by the
courts. This Article suggests their time has come.
IV. CONCLUSION
The teachings of Harper & Row and Sony, that the value of a
work in the marketplace is an element worthy of consideration in
fair use cases, lead to the conclusion that potentially serious harms
are at issue in musical parody cases. If the Supreme Court's hold-
ings in regard to fair use are to have any meaning in this context,
then courts must seriously examine the potential harm to the origi-
nal composer's musical expression. Particularly in light of the Sec-
142. B. MONACO & J. RIORDAN, THE PLATINUM RAINBOW 49 (1980).
[Vol. 6:35
24
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 3
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol6/iss1/3
HARMS OF MUSICAL PARODY
ond and Ninth Circuits' willingness to allow a parodist to appro-
priate the "heart of a composition" and the "recognizable main
theme" in musical parody cases, such an inquiry must explore po-
tential harm to the derivative markets for the original copyrighted
work. Courts must focus particular attention on the original com-
poser's musical expression, which the parodist rarely parodies, but
invariably copies to effectuate his parody. When undertaking this
examination, the courts must recognize that a composer's musical
expression is a distinct element of musical copyright, the compo-
nent that is the most easily recognizable and hence the most com-
mercially valuable in the musical composition. Viewed as a whole,
to allow a parodist to appropriate the expression without assessing
the potential harm to it is to devalue the original author's property
right in his intellectual creation.
This is not to suggest that musical parody should cease. It
does mean that the composer should not be made an innocent vic-
tim of the struggle between the lyricist and the parodist. If the
parodist is not going to parody the original composer's expression,
then ways must be found to protect the financial interest of the
composer. Moreover, the composer should be given an opportunity
to demonstrate that any proposed parody could sufficiently harm
his or her copyrighted expression as to warrant a limit on that use.
There is no easy solution to this issue because of the basic ten-
sion between the parodist and the copyright holder. Nevertheless,
in drawing a line, the courts at least ought to inquire whose inter-
ests really are hurt by parody and take steps to limit the potential
damage. The parodist who appropriates the original author's musi-
cal expression may or may not be adding to the wealth of musical
knowledge, but he or she is most certainly capitalizing on the al-
ready-established public recognition of that expression. Takings
that devalue one author's musical work to promote musical paro-
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